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TenDeRInG UnIveRsal seRvICe 
oblIGaTIons In lIbeRalIzeD  
neTwoRk InDUsTRIes*
Christian Jaag and Urs trinkner
Abstract
In the past decades, several countries have introduced reverse auctions for allocating 
universal service or public mission subsidies in various industries. Examples include 
urban transport, air transport and telecommunications. Recently, such mechanisms 
have also been envisioned in liberalized postal markets. Issuing an invitation to 
tender for obligations in otherwise liberalized markets significantly differs from 
auctioning off a monopolistic provision of services or goods (“competition for the 
market”), as is e.g. the case with spectrum auctions in the telecommunications 
sector. We discuss the rationale for introducing such a regulatory regime as well as 
conceptual and practical issues concerning its implementation.
It turns out that designing an efficient tender for universal service subsidies in 
liberalized markets is considerably more difficult than tendering e.g. a monopoly 
franchise. A first reason is that the cost assessment is more complex in the former 
case as future competitive market outcomes have to be anticipated; in the case with 
franchise bidding, at least the number of competitors is given by the tender itself. 
Hence, revenue effects caused by competitors are easier to calculate. Second, the 
threat of a winner’s moral hazard requires more detailed ex ante regulations. These 
raise the social cost of universal service provision. Compared to direct designation 
of universal services with ex post compensation, tendering causes a series of 
fundamental concerns and trade-offs that make the application of auctions less 
attractive than in other sectors.
Keywords: procurement; tendering; reverse auctions; universal service obligation; 
liberalization
* The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the 
institutions with which they are affiliated.
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1. INtRoDUCtIoN
In the past decades, several countries have introduced reverse auctions for allocating 
universal service obligations (Uso) or public mission subsidies in different industries 
such as urban transport, air transport and telecommunications.1 Recently, such 
mechanisms have also been envisioned in the postal sector. we discuss the rationale 
for introducing tendering as well as conceptual and practical issues concerning its 
implementation.
a reverse auction or tender2 is a standard way in which governments procure any 
good or service. when a government needs to purchase something or provide it to the 
public, it issues a request for bids describing specifically what it wants. Firms submit 
proposals, and the government selects the firm with the best (lowest) bid. while it is 
easier to conduct a reverse auction for simple products, governments have also used 
them to purchase complex goods like defence systems or construction projects. This 
demonstrates that feasible auctions are not necessarily simple.
However, issuing an invitation to tender for obligations in otherwise liberalized 
markets significantly differs from auctioning off the monopolistic provision of services 
or goods (“competition for the market”). In the former case, the winning party must 
stand up to competitors without such obligations. This significantly adds to the risk 
taken by potential universal service providers, hence introducing additional cost, and 
raises some fundamental trade-offs.
Based on considerations about the calculation of the net cost of universal service 
obligations, we discuss the implications for tendering universal services. we cover 
distributional as well as allocative aspects and highlight trade-offs concerning the 
optimum design of such a tender.
The paper argues that – if operators participate in the reverse auction at all – the 
threat of a “winner’s curse” situation combined with the operators’ limited liability 
raises concerns about the sustainability of a tendering regime to ensure universal 
service. a further issue is the costs of regulatory restrictions that might limit future 
business options. such costs can be predicted by use of (real) options theory. It turns 
out that these costs are higher under a tendering regime as governments must specify 
more detailed ex ante regulations to ensure a workable auction and to limit 
opportunistic behaviour of the winner (“winner’s moral hazard”).
we conclude that in many cases, self-provision or direct negotiation might prove 
more suitable than tenders.
The paper proceeds as follows. section 2 provides an overview on the basic options 
available to governments in public procuring. Competitive tendering is one option 
that has to be assessed against a considerable number of criteria. section 3 focuses on 
1 Cf. e.g. Milgrom (1996).
2 we use “tendering”, “reverse auctions” and “procurement auctions” synonymously.
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tendering obligations in otherwise liberalized markets. we discuss efficiency 
properties and highlight basic trade-offs that arise out of tender mechanisms. In 
section 4, we summarize the challenges involved in tendering universal service 
obligations in liberalized markets and provide our conclusions.
2. tHe Role oF teNDeRINg IN PUBlIC PRoCUReMeNt
at the beginning of any public procurement, there is usually a public need that markets 
fail to satisfy.3 The need might stem from a lack of infrastructures or services that a 
society as a whole (but not individuals) is willing to pay for. we do not further explore 
this subject and take it as a given that there exists a public need for services including 
an appropriate willingness to pay for those services (either by the individuals 
themselves and/or by society as a whole).
In such a situation, the state must ask itself how to best ensure the provision of the 
requested services. The major options are depicted in Figure 1.
In the first stage, a bundle of duties and rights has to be specified. The definition of 
the bundle is crucial and will determine the market structure and the financial burden 
imposed by the requested services/obligations. For example, the inclusion of exclusive 
rights has ambivalent effects: The need for state subsidies will be lowered at the expense 
of lacking competition within the tendered market. The definition of the bundle also 
determines the character of the mandate, e.g. in case of substantial exclusive rights a 
contract will resemble franchising rather than outsourcing. we will explore this issue 
in more detail in section 3.1. In a second stage, a choice is necessary whether the 
bundle should be provided by the state itself or delegated to the market. In case of 
market delegation, the state can choose over various options including beauty contests 
and tendering in a third stage. Finally, in a fourth stage, the company mandated with 
the public mission can procure parts of its mission in turn.
3 such a situation is called a ‘market failure’ in the industrial organization literature.
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Figure 1. Decision-Tree for Public Procurement
Public provision Contracting 
TenderingNegotiation
Denition of a bundle of duties and 
rights, possibly including 
exclusivity
Subcontracting 
TenderingNegotiation
many forms 
in between 
Public need? 
Public or private 
provision? 
− Need of infrastructures or services that are 
not provided by the market? 
− Willingness to pay, nancing need, and 
nancial resources? 
− Who is more ecient? 
− Who should and can bear the risk? 
− Bargaining power in the long run? 
− Transaction costs and monitoring issues? 
− Political considerations? 
− Asymmetric information? 
Tendering  
or negotiation? 
− Industry structure? 
− Allocative/distributional
concerns? 
− Basic Trade-Os? 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
Stage 3 
[Stage 4] 
source: author’s own.
2.1. CRUCIal CoNsIDeRatIoNs
2.1.1. Public Provision or Contracting? (Stage 2)
If a government has a mandate to provide certain services to the public that are 
currently not supplied by the market, it has two basic options: (1) Public provision by 
the state. This option is often chosen for critical goods such as police and military 
forces, or utilities such as water, electricity, or postal services which to date remain in 
the public domain in most countries. (2) Contracting for the requested services at 
certain conditions. The government can choose between direct negotiations with 
selected parties, beauty contests based on various selection criteria, or public tendering, 
where a market mechanism is implemented to choose the optimal candidate at the 
lowest cost. Public tendering has been successfully applied in large government 
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projects, e.g. construction (“construction bidding”).4 In recent times, tendering 
mechanisms have been increasingly and successfully applied in urban transport. 
some attempts have been made in network industries but the results are ambiguous.5
The decision of the state over self-provision or contracting depends upon five main 
criteria. First, efficiency considerations should be made. who will provide a certain 
service more efficient, a state run company or a private company? Thereby, expected 
cost structures are relevant, for example the presence of public-servant regulations 
that increase wages in the case of self-provision, possible economies of scope with 
other services (other government or private services) as well as capital costs and 
expected profit margins which are usually larger for private companies. second, the 
risk bearing capacity should be considered carefully. For instance, large and risky 
investments over a long time horizon are usually not suitable for private companies. 
Compared to public enterprises, they have lower risk capacity and expect a market 
oriented (higher) risk compensation – otherwise investors would not invest. generally, 
efficient contracting is easier to achieve if low investment risks are involved, i.e. good 
predictability of costs and earnings. Furthermore, the state should consider the effects 
on its long term bargaining power which can change over time. among others, hold up 
risks and the possibility of a “winner’s moral hazard” should be considered (cf. section 
3.3). If the threat of renegotiation of the contract is high, authorities might prefer self-
provision of services.6 also, transaction costs are to be considered, e.g. the costs of 
periodically organizing a tender and the cost of properly monitoring the contracted 
quality of service. If proper monitoring is not possible and the necessary incentives 
are not possible to create, contracting might not be appropriate. Finally, political 
considerations have to be taken into account, i.e. should the state provide the service 
at all or would private service provision be more desirable to minimize the scope of 
the state.
2.1.2. Contracting: Direct Negotiation, or Tendering? (Stage 3)
In case of contracting there are various options at disposal. They range from direct 
negotiation, where a specific contract or service level is directly negotiated between 
the representatives of the state and a private enterprise, to tendering, where a bundle 
of rights and duties is publicly procured and virtually any candidate can apply for the 
4 The wto Uruguay round agreement on government procurement requires participant countries to 
tender certain government purchases. The agreement contains numerous provisions on the 
procurement process, including on the use of selected and invited tendering, the nature of technical 
specifications used in tenders, and the criteria to award contracts.
5 Cf. Calzada et al. (2010) for an overview.
6 Indeed empirically there is a large possibility that contracts will be renegotiated. Cf. section 3.3.1.
1e PR
o
ef
Christian Jaag and Urs trinkner
318 Intersentia
contract.7 There are various intermediate possibilities in-between those two extreme 
options, such as competitive dialogue, where a number of predetermined operators 
are selected and invited to make an offer (“beauty contest”).
The main criteria at this stage are asymmetric information, industry structure, 
allocative and distributional concerns, and a number of basic trade-offs. The degree of 
asymmetric information determines how well the government can judge over the 
offers given by the candidates. If the knowledge is poor, a single candidate might 
overestimate the associated costs and underestimate future earnings. Note that, as in 
most principal-agent problems, a lack of knowledge of the principal (the government) 
is inherent. tendering (is a means to overcome such information asymmetries by a 
market mechanism. It aims at introducing competition for the market. Potential 
operators are given incentives to uncover their true costs and enable governments to 
select the best offer (stemming from the most efficient operator). Hence, under 
competitive conditions, a tendering procedure might shed light on the true costs of 
(universal) service obligations and ensure an efficient allocation of public mandates 
among various potential providers.8 The degree of competitiveness of a tender depends 
heavily on the specific industry structure, for example on the number of potential 
candidates. only a sufficiently large number of interested operators will ensure a 
competitive tender that forces the contractors to uncover their true costs and hence an 
auction that resolves the issue of asymmetric information. This will rarely be the case 
in network industries, as they are characterized by considerable fixed and sunk costs, 
and market power or collusive behaviour might be an issue.9 Third, the uncertainty 
associated with large tendering contracts entails allocative and distributional concerns 
(cf. section 3.3). Fourth, tendering generates some basic and pertinent trade-offs (cf. 
section 3.4). For example, investment incentives might be negatively affected. It turns 
out that, among other factors, it is of importance whether exclusive rights are granted 
or not. we will analyze these issues in more detail in the following sections.
2.1.3. Remark on Subcontracting (Stage 4)
Irrespective of the chosen options, state-run enterprises with public mandates as well 
as contracted private operators again have the possibility to subcontract parts of the 
mandate (as illustrated in Figure 1). Thereby, most of the options and criteria mentioned 
7 Many different auction designs are at disposal. we won’t discuss the issue in detail and refer to the 
specialized literature on auction theory. Calzada et al. (2010) provide a short overview in the context 
of auctions in network industries.
8 However, this does not solve the problem of moral hazard associated with providing services once 
the auction is won.
9 Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and armstrong et al. (1994) have shown their skepticism about the use 
of auctions in presence of important sunk costs and have pointed out that the contacts should 
include mechanisms to account for future changes in the market. However, as pointed out by 
williamson (1976), usually contracts are incomplete and cannot cover all possible contingencies.
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above apply again. In other words, private and public outsourcing decisions are to a 
large extent alike from an economic point of view.10
2.2. CoNClUDINg ReMaRks
as all stages are interdependent, decision makers should take into account all stages 
simultaneously. In an ideal world, one could resolve the issue by backwards integration. 
one aspect with the most drawbacks is the definition of a bundle of duties and rights 
in the first stage. Note that in practice, tenders usually include exclusivity; auctions 
are used to allocate an entire market or submarket to one contactor which will face no 
competition within that market. However, in Uso auctions in liberalized network 
industries this will not be the case. one operator will end up with duties whereas its 
competitors can do whatever they want. This situation changes the nature of the 
tender significantly, as we will see in the following section.
3. teNDeRINg Uso IN lIBeRalIzeD MaRkets
Universal service obligations are a common policy for ensuring a public need which 
is not adequately satisfied by market forces. Contracting off the obligation to provide 
universal services implies altering the (optimal) market behaviour of at least one 
contractor by imposing binding constraints to its behaviour. Hence, universal service 
provision is costly for the providers11 and for the society as a whole. The government 
has two basic options to impose the requested service level (universal service 
obligations) on the market:
(1) For all: The Uso applies to any player in the market. all market players must fulfil 
all obligations or retreat from the market.
(2) For one: Market players must not meet the Uso. Instead, a mechanism (for example 
tendering) is applied to designate one market player to provide the Uso. The 
mechanism raises the issue of proper compensation for the designated operator 
who should not be worse off due to the obligations (“level playing field”).
In order to minimize the economic cost of Uso provision (or maximize overall 
welfare), it usually makes sense to impose a universal service obligation to one sole 
operator (option 2). Providing such services by several operators in parallel would 
yield an unnecessary multiplication of productive inefficiencies.
10 Differences include political issues such as idea of state or the importance of direct client relationships 
in outsourcing decisions of private companies.
11 whether and to what extent the Uso is compensated for its burden is then merely a distributional 
matter.
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Hence, the question is how to select and compensate the universal service provider 
(UsP). auctions have the primary advantage to fulfil both tasks simultaneously at the 
same time in a transparent way (selection and determination of subsidy). In the 
following subsection, we discuss the relationship between the well known bidding for 
exclusive rights and tendering universal service obligations. Then, we focus on the 
intricacies of the latter.
3.1. teNDeRINg exClUsIVe RIgHts Vs. DUtIes
a key issue when considering public tendering as a means to delegate universal service 
obligations is whether the obligations are linked with substantial exclusive rights or 
not. Note that in most liberalized markets, tenders cannot include exclusive rights (by 
definition).
auctions involving exclusive rights lead to competition for the market and 
essentially equal franchise bidding. Thereby, the procuring body has the possibility to 
extract monopoly rents.12 as we focus in the paper on auctions involving no exclusivity, 
we will not develop the issue in more detail and refer the reader for franchise bidding 
in utilities to Harstad and Crew (1999) and for postal services to Borrmann (2004).
without exclusive rights, i.e. if universal service obligations are tendered to one 
operator that afterwards will compete with other players in the same market, the latter 
not being restricted in its business decisions, things are more complicated.
From an operator’s point of view, universal service obligations mean binding 
restrictions on product definitions, network size, quality level and pricing flexibility13 
that affect both cost structures and consumer demand. Ultimately, market shares are 
affected. Hence, compared to franchise bidding, business risks increase considerably, 
as the relative effects compared with other competitors have to be considered and 
quantified. The pricing mechanism is no longer available to finance extra obligations, 
as prices are determined in the market and hence uneconomic quality or product 
levels cannot be shifted onwards to consumers (in the form of higher prices) but must 
be paid by external funds (the operators bid in the procurement auction). Note that, as 
no exclusive rights are granted, operators that do not “win” the Uso auction can still 
provide any service. Hence, operators willing to participate in a Uso tender have to 
quantify the cost of the restrictions in a competitive setting imposed by asymmetric 
universal service obligations.
12 However, one should carefully think whether this is appropriate and elaborate in detail the 
associated investment incentives and effects on overall welfare.
13 In case uniform prices or affordability constraints are part of the Uso.
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3.2. kNowINg tHe Cost oF Uso aND “Net Costs CoNCeRN”
auctioning off goods and tendering obligations for universal services in particular 
require that the bidders know the value or – in our case – the “net cost” they are 
bidding for (as a difference in profits resulting from a successful tender). In many 
countries universal services consist of a number of different, interacting dimensions 
that affect both costs and consumer demand. typical dimensions include:
– Product Range: a list of products and services covered by the Uso;
– Coverage/Accessibility: Requirements where, when and how these products must 
be available. Usually, services must be offered nationwide (“ubiquitous service”) 
and be easily accessible;
– Prices: Restrictions in pricing. For example, prices must be cost-oriented, 
affordable, uniform, or provide incentives for efficient service provision;
– Quality: Minimum standards that must be met for the Uso products;
– Infrastructure: often, there are obligations to operate certain infrastructures. 
examples include phone boxes or post offices.
when the obligation to provide universal services is tendered among competitors 
under perfect conditions, its cost is determined by the market. From a public point of 
view, there is no need of any Uso calculation.14 However, from a potential provider’s 
point of view, the cost must be estimated for being able to submit a substantial bid.
There are a number of methods to calculate the cost or burden of the Uso. For an 
operator, the methodology of Panzar (2000) is relevant which establishes that the cost 
of the Uso is the difference of an operator’s profit comparing a situation with and 
without Uso.15 generally, the calculations are quite difficult and should include the 
various interactions between the different Uso dimensions as well as the relevant 
intangible and market benefits which accrue to a universal service provider.
If tenders do not include exclusive rights, future competitive market outcomes 
have to be anticipated in addition. Under such circumstances, the following factors 
influence the net cost of universal service provision directly or indirectly:
– Universal service obligation: This is the most obvious factor. Dimensions include 
restrictions in product definitions, coverage/accessibility, pricing, quality, product 
definitions, and infrastructures. while single dimensions of Uso may not be 
binding restrictions, it is often the combination of various aspects which limits an 
operator’s strategic options and therefore constitute a net cost.16
14 still, the government might desire to estimate the cost of the Uso in advance to ensure that the 
necessary funds are available. similarly, if it anticipates that only a view operators will participate 
in the bid, it might define some maximum subsidies according to its own estimations.
15 an overview is provided by oxera (2007) or Jaag, koller and trinkner (2009).
16 Cf. Jaag, koller and trinkner (2009) on the interactions of various Uso dimensions.
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– Universal service provider: The efficiency of the operator himself determines the 
burden directly.
– Universal service financing: There is an important link between Uso costing and 
financing where the necessary funds are collected in the market place (for example 
by compensation funds). If the cost of the Uso is calculated without considering 
the financing instrument in place, this might result in under- or over-
compensation.17
– Competitors: The cost also depends on the competitors’ strategies. If universal 
service provision include the operation of certain infrastructures, high competitive 
activity may result in inefficient operating scales which translate into net costs. 
similarly, uniform pricing obligations might turn out costly if this fosters market 
entry in low cost segments of the market.
– Regulation: also the regulatory framework (e.g. network access regulation, labour 
market regulations) influences costs and competitive pressure as this determines 
the market structure in which universal services are provided.
– Technology: The supply-side of the market is critically determined by the available 
technology. Depending on its evolution, the net cost of providing universal services 
may change dramatically over time.
– Preferences: Consumer behaviour constitutes the demand side of the market. If 
preferences change over time, this also affects the net cost of services.
Many of these factors are difficult to predict. In practice, calculating the cost of the 
Uso in a liberalized environment is a difficult task even if it is done one a year by year 
basis.
tendering renders the issue even more difficult. In network industries, contract 
periods typically range from 3 to 15 years. Hence, operators must anticipate the above 
factors for long periods of time. as opposed to the case of franchise bidding where the 
tender includes exclusive service provision, the number of future competitors is not 
known at the time of tendering. still, it is necessary to correctly anticipate the yearly 
market equilibria during the contract period. Thereby, the winner faces asymmetric 
regulations that potentially hamper its commercial freedom. If market conditions 
change, important parts of the business are regulated and corporate flexibility is 
limited. This effect could (or should) be captured by the introduction of real options 
into the operators’ profit functions. These real options increase in value with longer 
time horizons, greater uncertainty and fewer regulations and obligations that a 
company faces. Hence, uncertainty about the future will increase the (social) cost of 
the Uso, as the winning operator must be compensated for the cost of the real option 
it is giving up. These costs are higher in auction mechanisms as these require – 
compared to direct Uso designation with yearly ex post compensation – a suboptimal 
high level of detailed ex ante Uso regulations.
17 Cf. Jaag and trinkner (2009) on the interaction between Uso costing and financing.
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Hence, a first concern is as follows: Relative to direct designation procedures with 
yearly ex post compensation of net costs, Uso auctions increase the net costs of the 
Uso.
3.3. DIstRIBUtIoNal aND alloCatIVe CoNCeRNs
tendering aims to ensure a potentially “good” outcome in terms of efficiency (choosing 
the provider with the lowest cost) and distributive effects (paying him the least possible 
compensation). However, neither of these desirable outcomes is likely to emerge 
directly from a tendering procedure.
In the following, we first discuss the distributional concern; then the allocative 
concern. For illustration purposes, we assume that the net cost is a random variable 
whose distribution is known to the public.
3.3.1. Distributional Concern: Winner’s Curse or Winner’s Moral Hazard
tendering universal service obligations ideally guarantees that the winning bidder is 
not able to earn an excessive rent at the expense of the public. This is the major 
distributional concern.
Winner’s Curse
Consider first a tendering situation in which each bidder knows his idiosyncratic cost 
of the universal service obligation being auctioned, but that information is private and 
independent of other bidders’ information.
Figure 2. The winner’s curse with homogeneous bidders
   
source: author’s own.
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For the simplicity of the argument assume that the cost of providing universal service 
would be the same for all potential providers, i.e. the cost is a “common value” 
(horizontal line in Figure 2). Hence, from the point of view of productive efficiency it 
does not matter who will win. However, the cost is not exactly known to the operators 
for the reasons outlined above. Under such circumstances, it is a well known result in 
auction theory that the bidder tends to call for a too low compensation (“winner›s 
curse”). suppose that all bidders obtain an unbiased estimate of the real net cost (grey 
columns in Figure 2). If bids are a monotone function of this estimate, then the auction 
will select the bidder as winner who received the most optimistic estimate – bidder no. 
2 in the Figure. But this requires the average winning estimate to be lower than actual 
cost. Hence, to play the auction right, such an adverse selection bias must be accounted 
for by the operators at the bidding stage by shading the bid to avoid bankruptcy.18
The winner’s curse in common value auctions implies that an increase in the 
number of bidders has two opposing effects on the bidding behaviour: First, the 
increased competition leads to more aggressive bidding.19 This effect is similar to the 
outcome in standard competitive situations and private value auctions (with a positive 
value) where increased demand through additional customers leads to higher prices. 
second, bidders recognize that the potential for the winner’s curse becomes more 
severe, which induces them to make larger upward adjustments to their cost assessment 
to avoid losses in the event they win. as a result, an increase in competition in our 
framework can lead to higher winning bids and therefore to higher public costs of 
universal service provision.
Hence, there are two possible outcomes from a distributional point of view:
1. If costs are equal among operators and they bid irrationally, the winner receives 
too small compensation for providing universal services.
2. If cost information is private or if operators bid rationally, they shade their bid and 
claim too much compensation which has to be financed via costly tax revenues.
which of these outcomes is more likely? Milgrom and weber (1982) discuss the 
possibility of the winner’s curse and propose an empirical test: In a common value 
auction, with a higher number of participants, bidders will rationally lower their bids 
to prevent a winner’s curse from happening, while in a private value ascending auction 
(or if participants bid rationally in a common value auction), the number of bidders 
should not have an effect on bids.
In their empirical model, Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) let each participant expect 
the distribution of the number of bidders in the auction to be a Poisson random 
variable, whose mean depends on auction characteristics such as the book value of the 
18 Bankruptcy might also be costly for the state and lead to renegotiations, hold-up problems, or 
re-tendering (which involves paying a bid again).
19 Cf. e.g. Mcafee and McMillan (1987).
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object, and the minimum bid/reserve price policy of the seller. They find that for an 
average auction in their data set (i.e. when all variables, such as book value are set to 
their sample means), a bidder with an estimate equal to the average book value of 
$47.00 should only bid $41.50. I.e. bidders will, due to the winner’s curse, reduce their 
bid by twelve percent. For an average auction on eBay, Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) find 
that bidders lower their bids by 3.2% per additional competitor and that, hence, 
increased competition on the demand side does not reduce consumer rents. This 
evidence suggests that bidding on eBay can be characterized as a common value 
auction rather than a private value auction.
In a study on highway and bridge repair contracts Hong and shum (2002) find that 
the average procurement cost is strictly increasing in the number of bidders. an 
increase in the number of bidders from three to six induces an increase in average cost 
of approximately 15%. This suggests that the common value component of highway 
construction projects is important and may lead to the winner’s curse. also, Hendricks 
et al. (1987) find in their analysis concerning auctions of outer Continental shelf 
leases that for many firms, the difference between the actual profits earned and those 
that would have been earned with optimal bidding amounted to hundreds of millions 
of dollars. They conclude that: “This result suggests that some firms may have 
systematically overvalued the tracts and/or failed to fully anticipate the impact of the 
winner’s curse.” (p. 529). Thaler (1988) presents further experimental evidence and 
field studies suggesting that the winner’s curse is a common phenomenon.
Winner’s Moral Hazard
In the examples discussed above, participants in auctions seem to behave sub-
optimally at first glance as the winner’s curse cannot occur if operators bid rationally 
(cf. Cox and Isaac, 1984). However, if a tender leads to a systematically underfunded 
provision of universal services, this will likely result in renegotiations of terms in 
favour of the winner. once the auction is won, two scenarios are possible. If things 
work out, the winner gets a profit and keeps it. In case of underfunding, the government 
will be forced to renegotiate the contract. Clearly, the bargaining position of the 
government and the UsP will depend on the government’s Uso replacement costs 
and the UsP’s equity at stake. typically, the latter will be significantly lower in size 
and hence the UsP’s liability is limited. Hence, bearing in mind this possibility of 
renegotiation, asking initially for a low subsidy could not be so irrational after all.20
20 guasch, laffont and strauss (2002) analyze firm-led renegotiations in latin america using data of 
307 concession projects in the sectors of transport and water in argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
and Mexico between 1984 and 2000. They show that more than half of these projects were 
renegotiated on average 3.5 years after signing the contract.
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a second form of moral hazard relates to the winner’s incentives for short term 
profit maximization. The operator that wins the auction may offer poor service, reduce 
investments, or find other ways to maximize short-run profits.
3.3.2. Allocative Concern
The second concern with tendering universal service obligations is related to the 
choice of the winning bidder. The objective is to choose the most efficient producer 
with the most efficient technology. assume in contrast to the section above that all 
potential operators do not have the same net cost of providing universal services 
(horizontal lines in Figure 3). Then, from a welfare perspective, it matters who wins 
the auction. In our illustrative example, bidder no.1 would win ideally. Bulow and 
klemperer (2002) show that common value auctions are almost always won by the 
bidder with the highest signal. In our setting, this leaves open the question whether it 
is the most efficient bidder who receives to highest signal. If information about future 
market outcomes varies, this is not guaranteed. Hence, universal service provision 
may be inefficient through the choice of a suboptimal production technology. In 
Figure 3, bidder no.2 receives the lowest signal and therefore wins the auction even 
though she does not have the lowest cost.
Figure 3. Bidding with heterogeneous bidders
  
source: author’s own.
3.4. BasIC tRaDe-oFFs IN DesIgNINg a Uso teNDeR
The net cost, distributional and allocative concerns are inherent in a tendering 
procedure and cannot really be mitigated by optimal tender design. apart from these, 
there are trade-offs to be considered when implementing a tender for universal service 
provision.
a first trade-off relates to the level of concreteness of the specific Uso requirements. 
Detailed provisions on quality levels, accessibility criteria and so on are important for 
a correctly specified ex-ante contract that is in line with the need of the procurement 
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authority but might unnecessary hamper the commercial flexibility of the Uso 
operator. such detailed provisions get increasingly problematic with longer durations 
as customer behaviour changes over time. on the other hand, abstract Uso definitions 
reduce both the operators’ and regulator’s legal certainty and provide only an unclear 
basis for any Uso cost calculations. a loose level of regulations might also give room 
for quality reductions or strategic underinvestment.
a second and interrelated trade-off relates to the duration of the contract period. 
typically, such contracts range between three and fifteen years. The longer the 
contract, the larger are the investment incentives for the winning operator (and vice 
versa). switching cost play a minor role if the contract period is long enough. similarly, 
the issue of sunk costs is less severe in relative terms. otherwise, longer contract 
periods involve larger market risks: The burden of the Uso is more uncertain to 
predict and the Uso operator as well as the government have fewer possibilities to 
adapt the Uso over time to the customers needs (renegotiations should be avoided for 
fairness reasons with respect to the succumbing parties in the tender). Recall that the 
value of the real option that the winner of the auction forbears increases with the 
length of the contract period and the intensity of regulations. similarly, in the light of 
imperfect bidding markets, the government’s risks are higher with long contract 
periods. In case of over-compensation, the contractor will insist that the contract will 
be fulfilled. In case of under-compensation (winner’s curse), the contractor will 
renegotiate the contract or step down (winner’s moral hazard). Hence, defining the 
optimal duration time of tendered contracts is a complex task. longer time horizons 
might be needed for dynamic efficiency considerations but might result in higher 
compensation needs and risks.
a third trade-off involves the decision on the level of aggregation: should the Uso 
be tendered globally or divided up into various pieces and procured in various smaller 
tenders? a global approach has the advantage – apart from fewer transaction costs –, 
that economies of scale and scope can be exploited optimally. on the other hand, 
dividing the Uso up into several pieces, for example various regions, enables yardstick 
competition which could result in a more transparent provision of the Uso. However, 
such a disaggregated approach involves complex interconnection issues raising the 
costs of universal service provision. Moreover, system rigidities are introduced and 
increase over time, economies of scale and or scope are not exploited optimally, and 
brand advantages are lost.
a forth trade-off relates to the ownership of the incumbent operator starting from 
a situation with public ownership. For fairness and consistency reasons, tendering 
should come along with a full privatization of the formerly state-owned operator. 
otherwise, conflicts of interests are prevalent and a level playing field between the 
various Uso candidates is not guaranteed. However, privatizing might be more costly 
in the long run. If tenders result in over-compensation, the additional profits are not 
public anymore. In case of under-compensation, it is likely that the government will 
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need to enter into costly renegotiations (cf. winner’s moral hazard above). In average, 
the government will need to spend more subsidies.
Note that those trade-offs are directly linked to tendering and do not apply for 
government self-provision. For the case of direct negotiation, some trade-offs can 
more easy be resolved than in the case of tendering.
3.5. IllUstRatIoN: ReCeNt Uso “teNDeRs” IN eURoPe
In practice, these concerns and trade-offs reveal themselves in applications of Uso 
“tenders” in europe where the standard reverse auction rules are changed considerably. 
In effect, they rather resemble direct designation than tendering. to illustrate, we (1) 
briefly present a recent swiss subsidy auction in the telecommunications market and 
(2) discuss the most recent postal directive that allows for tendering.
The swiss telecommunications act21 envisions competitive tendering of selected 
universal services. such services include call boxes and most recently a nationwide 
provision of broadband internet based on aDsl technology. Thereby, no substantial 
exclusive rights are involved in the tender: The winner of the reverse auction will have 
to compete against competitors that can, regardless of the auction, provide the same 
services too. Interestingly the auction takes place even if the requested service level is 
already provided in the market. Hence the swiss legislation lacks an ex-ante test 
whether there is a need for governmental intervention. If the best bid entails a subsidy 
request (if the obligations are binding this should be expected), the winner will be 
obliged to open its books such that the regulatory authority is capable to verify the 
winner’s financial burden of providing universal services. This is somewhat in contrast 
to the economic reasoning of auctions that aim to reveal the lowest need of subsidies 
implicitly through competition (competitive tendering). Hence, the winner does not 
automatically receive its winning bit. Instead it receives a subsidy that the state 
considers appropriate based on net costs and “efficient service provision”, i.e. the net 
costs cost of a hypothetical operator. similarly, the operator with the best offer cannot 
be sure that it will be accepted as the winner. In case the regulatory authority asserts 
that the tender did not take place under “competitive circumstances”, the law enables 
the regulator to ignore the result of the auction. Instead it can designate one operator 
for Uso provision. In case the designated operator should ask for compensation in 
return, it must calculate the burden according to standards issued by the regulatory 
authority and open its books to proof the calculations. once the authority accepts the 
compensation need, a compensation fund will be raised with contributions from all 
telecom operators (including the designated Uso operator). Up to date there were two 
such “tenders” organized in switzerland, the latest in 2007. Not surprisingly, in both 
cases only one applicant, the incumbent swisscom, participated in the tender (more or 
21 Fernmeldegesetz (FMg), issue of april 1st 2007.
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less forced by its major shareholder, the government). Note that swisscom did apply 
“for free”, i.e. its bid was CHF 0 (to avoid opening its books in view that an eventual 
net compensation would have been negligible).22 However, the regulator did not accept 
this (quite favourable) bid. Instead it cancelled the auction and designated swisscom 
as Uso operator giving it the right to request compensation subject to detailed 
calculation requirements and a stiff bill for the regulator’s expenses. swisscom 
announced that it would not request any compensation in the first 5 years of the 
concession.
The example illustrates the difficulties and concerns with Uso auctions in practice. 
similarly, the eC foresees Uso tendering procedures in its fully opened postal market 
that might not accept the winning bid.
The third european postal directive (2008/6/eC) envisages full market opening by 
2013 and allows for competitive Uso tendering: article 7(2) of the directive states that 
“… Member States may ensure the provision of universal services by procuring such 
services in accordance with applicable public procurement rules and regulations“. The 
meaning of subsequent art. 7(3) in relation to the tendering option is somewhat 
unclear. The article states that state subsidies or compensation funds might only be 
implemented if a “net cost” arises. These shall be verified by the national regulatory 
authority subject to detailed accounting requirements. as they stand, these provisions 
imply that the successful bid might not be accepted per se. The designated UsP will 
receive a subsidy equal to its bid only if detailed computations of the regulator lead to 
the same result as the auction. as a consequence, operators participating in the bid are 
aware that winning the auction means opening the books to the regulator. This might 
not be an attractive prospect. The eC provisions can be interpreted as a presumption 
that reverse auctions will likely not result in efficient subsidy levels in the postal sector. 
so far, no subsidy auctions have been organized under the postal directive framework. 
In germany, a tendering mechanism for universal postal services was implemented in 
2008 when the market was completely liberalized. In the case that certain Uso 
elements are not provided by the market, the law foresees to auction the lacking Uso 
elements. such “incremental subsidy auctions” might result in more bidders – and 
eventually in a Uso provision that is less costly. However, as the subsidy auction is 
defined relative to Deutsche Post’s service plans, it would be astonishing to find 
another operator with smaller incremental costs. Hence, one might start negotiations 
directly with Deutsche Post instead of organizing a costly auction.
In contrast to these examples, subsidy auctions seem to work much better in 
developing countries.23 In these tenders, the requested universal services have usually 
22 Partly because of the design of the compensation fund which would have been mainly stocked by 
swisscom itself. generally, the inclusion of the incumbent translates to underfunding of the UsP 
unless the net cost calculation include the effects of the financing instrument, see Jaag and trinkner 
(2009).
23 Cf. Calzada et al. (2010) for an overview.
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not been provided yet and therefore the winner receives quasi-exclusive rights in the 
procured regions. These observations support the conclusion that the inclusion of 
exclusive rights is crucial for successful Uso tenders.
4. sUMMaRY aND CoNClUsIoN
we discussed the procurement and competitive tendering of universal service 
obligations. we conclude that tendering obligations is an inherently difficult task in 
liberalized network industries.
tendering is one option out of many to allocate universal service missions to an 
operator. Based on findings in the relevant literature, we highlighted the implications 
of tendering on investment as well as the cost and the sustainability of universal 
service, and the allocative and distributional efficiency of its procurement. Moreover, 
we discussed issues concerning the optimum design of such a tender. tenders raise 
three fundamental concerns and a series of basic trade-offs concerning the duration 
of the contract period, the level of aggregation and concreteness of the Uso contract 
as well as the legal status of potential universal service providers.
Network industries like telecommunications and posts have traditionally been 
characterized by state-run operators that had a public mission to provide the universal 
services. such obligations were compensated by granting extensive exclusive rights. 
auctioning universal service contracts brings higher risk to the market, not only for 
the winner but all competitors. Furthermore, auctions raise the need for more detailed 
ex ante regulations. Consequently, if contract periods are long, this again translates 
into higher risks for the designated universal service provider. These risks have to be 
compensated and will result in high public costs of universal service provision. 
Furthermore, it remains open how to resolve labour and infrastructure issues in case 
a well and traditionally established incumbent operator loses the tender.
Introducing a tender entails various political and economic challenges:
First, a fair and proper way of Uso tendering involves the loss of control rights of 
the government in its former public undertaking that was previously granted a 
monopoly to finance the Uso. More specifically, fair and consistent tenders require 
full privatization of the former incumbent, otherwise a level playing field is not 
ensured and various conflicts of interest remain. Hence governments must ask 
themselves whether they are ready and able to privatize their state-run undertakings 
properly.
second, Uso tendering requires that the state has the necessary funds and 
willingness to pay the winner of the auction the bidding price. otherwise, Uso 
requirements should be redefined in a market-oriented way to ensure that these are 
not binding and costly.
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Third, tenders increase information asymmetries between governments and 
contractors. Hence, the relatively loose and open missions of the state-owned 
enterprises must be replaced by detailed, precise and measurable Uso provisions. 
These are by necessity more static as they must be specified ex ante for the whole 
duration of the contracting period. any changes of the contracts should be 
compensated.
Fourth, governments must be aware of the hold-up risk and moral hazard issues 
that are involved in tendering. In case the winner of the auction did underestimate the 
cost of the Uso or more general in case of bankruptcy of the contractor, the government 
loses its invested compensation funds. Moreover, providing the operator in trouble 
with additional funds (“renegotiating”) might by optimal for the government as the 
alternative, organizing a new auction, might be more costly and result in temporary 
Uso under-provision. In anticipation of such opportunistic behaviour Uso 
contractors have hold-up incentives. other opportunistic behaviour includes short 
run profit maximizing by reducing quality or strategic underinvestment.
Fifth, and independently of strategic underinvestment, tendering will lead to lower 
investments into universal services; ceteris paribus, investments and projects have a 
lower net present value (cash flows after the end of the contract must be discounted by 
a larger factor).
we conclude that tenders are not a priori an ideal mechanism for procuring public 
services in liberalized and developed markets. Compared to other ways of delegating 
universal service obligations to the market, subsidy auctions raise a number of 
important concerns an trade-offs. The design of a tender should consider sector-
specific aspects, such as innovation and changing consumer needs. one size will not 
fit all. In order to ensure the frictionless function of universal service in liberalized 
markets, these issues should be thoroughly assessed and resolved before introducing 
a tender or other procurement mechanisms. In many cases, self-provision or direct 
negotiation might prove more suitable than tenders.
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